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FDI DETERMINATION AND CORPORATE TAX 





This paper investigates the role of economic and political volatility in the process of corporate 
tax-rate determination. The article is based on a theoretical framework that allows for the 
ability of multinational firms to choose the optimal timing of foreign investment and to shift 
profits by transfer pricing, and provides an empirical analysis on a large panel data set of 
countries over the 1983-2003 period. First, a reduced-form dynamic equation of corporate tax 
rate determination is estimated by the generalised method of moments (GMM), where a 
country’s top statutory corporate tax rate depends on a number of measures of economic and 
political volatility. The fundamental testable prediction derived from the theoretical model is 
that increased volatility should reduce a country’s corporate tax rate. Our results support the 
hypothesis that economic volatility is associated with lower top statutory corporate tax rates, 
while our measures of political volatility have no significant impact on corporate taxation 
policy. In order to identify the channels through which volatility works, we also estimate a 
structural model allowing for simultaneous determination of the corporate tax rate and the 
inflow of FDI to a particular country. The estimates of the structural model show that 
economic volatility affects the corporate tax setting process through their impact on FDI 
inflow. 
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Recent empirical research has addressed the important issue of corporate
income taxation in a context of globalisation and perfect capital mobility
(Devereux et al. [19], [20], Bretschger and Hettich [6], Markusen [32], Rodrik
[42], Slemrod [43], Winner [45], Hauﬂer et al. [25]). The liberalization of for-
eign exchange laws that occurred in most OECD countries in the mid and late
1980s basically implied free mobility of capital and generated a sharp rise in
FDI and multinational activity, creating the conditions for international tax
competition for mobile capital.1 International pressure for tax competition
has consequently been deemed responsib l ef o rt h ed e c l i n ei nt h es t a t u t o r y
corporate tax rates since the mid 1980s.2 In line with Rodrik [42], Dev-
ereux et al. [19] showed that the relaxation of capital controls stimulates tax
competition and thus reduces both statutory and eﬀective tax rates. Slem-
rod [43] came to a similar conclusion, where there is consistent evidence of
international competitive pressure, with the degree of capital market open-
ness being negatively associated with statutory corporate tax rates. Finally,
based on panel data on samples of OECD countries, Bretschger and Hettich
[6], Hauﬂer et al. [25] and Winner [45] found that capital mobility exerts
a negative impact on capital tax burden and a positive one on labour tax
burden.
This paper aims to estimate the eﬀects of economic and political volatil-
ity on the taxation of corporate proﬁts. In doing so we apply a theoretical
framework - mainly based on Panteghini and Schjelderup [39] - that allows
for investment irreversibility and for the ability of multinational companies
(MNCs) to choose the optimal timing of foreign investment and to shift
1Such phenomenon is documented, among the others, by Markusen [32].
2For instance, Lee and Gordon [30], Devereux et al. [20] and Slemrod [43] report that
in the 1980s the average top corporate tax rate was about 40%. In the late 1990s, it fell
to slightly more than 30%. Moreover, while the statutory tax rate on corporate proﬁts
exceeded by 50% the average labour tax wedge in 1980, the two were roughly the same
twenty years later (Hauﬂer et al. [25]).
2proﬁts by transfer pricing. In particular, this model suggests that higher
volatility - interpreted either as the probability of receiving bad news or as
the seriousness of the bad news (Bernanke [4]) - should induce governments
to reduce their tax rates on corporate proﬁts. The reason is that volatility
reduces the overall number of foreign ﬁr m si n v o l v e di nf o r e i g nd i r e c ti n v e s t -
ment (FDI). Consequently, the optimal policy response to the reduction in
a country’s tax base consists in lowering the corporate tax rate in order to
counteract the negative impact of increased volatility.
These predictions are tested on a panel data set of a large number of
countries over the 1983-2003 period. First, a reduced-form dynamic equation
of corporate tax rate determination is estimated by the generalised method
of moments (GMM), where the top statutory corporate tax rate depends on
a number of measures of economic and political volatility, along with a set
of variables reﬂecting the size, underlying economic structure and degree of
capital market openness in a country. Our results conﬁrm the hypothesis
that economic volatility is associated with lower top statutory corporate tax
rates, while our indexes of political volatility - the frequency of changes in
government and an index of the protection of property rights - do not appear
to have any signiﬁcant impact on corporate taxation policy.
In order to identify the channels through which volatility works, we also
introduce a structural model that allows for simultaneous determination of
the corporate tax rate and the FDI ﬂow into a country. The estimates show
that our measures of economic volatility signiﬁcantly and negatively aﬀect
the corporate tax rate through their impact on the inﬂow of FDI to a country.
Moreover, capital market openness has a negative eﬀect on the level of the
statutory corporate tax rate and a positive one on the size of FDI inﬂow.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the
theoretical framework used to analyze the impact of volatility on FDI ﬂow
and corporate tax-rate setting strategies. Section 3 turns to the empirical
implementation of the model by estimating a reduced-form dynamic equation
3of corporate tax rate determination, while section 4 tackles the structural
model for simultaneous determination of the corporate tax rate and the ﬂow
of FDI into a country. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
A common feature of the standard theoretical tax competition literature is
that capital investment is fully reversible or, alternatively, that capital in-
vestment is irreversible, although it is characterized by exogenous investment
timing. Moreover, most of the theoretical contributions on tax competition
disregard risk.3
As shown in Dixit and Pindyck [21], volatility has a negative impact on
investment timing. This discouraging impact does not necessarily depend on
risk aversion, but rather is due to the so-called Bad News Principle (BNP),4
according to which investment depends on the seriousness of bad news and its
probability, but is independent of good news. Indeed, an increase in volatility
means that good news gets better and bad news gets worse: since good news
does not matter, increased volatility raises the threshold proﬁtr a t ea b o v e
which FDI is undertaken. Therefore, an increase in volatility delays FDI
timing. This ﬁnding is in line with empirical evidence, which shows a neg-
ative relationship between uncertainty and FDI. In particular, Chen and So
[10] showed that the 1997 Asian ﬁn a n c i a lc r i s i s( w h i c hc a u s e da ni n c r e a s ei n
exchange rate variability) discouraged FDI by US MNCs. Further evidence
is provided by Aizenman and Marion [2], who focused on the foreign oper-
ations of US MCNs since 1989. They showed that uncertainty aﬀects both
vertical and horizontal FDI. In particular, they showed that greater supply
uncertainty reduces the expected income from vertical FDI but increases the
expected income from horizontal FDI. Greater demand uncertainty adversely
aﬀects the expected income under both production modes. Moreover, volatil-
3Exceptions are Gordon and Varian [23] and Lee [29].
4See Bernanke [4].
4ity and sovereign risk have a greater adverse impact on vertical FDI than on
horizontal FDI.5
Applying the BNP, Panteghini and Schjelderup [39] model tax competi-
tion between two identical small open countries. In constructing the social
welfare function for each country, they focus on the sum between proﬁts (or
equivalently, the producer surplus) generated by FDI and tax revenue from
foreign ﬁrms’ FDI in the home country. Hence, each government maximizes
the welfare function, i.e.,
max
τi
Wi i = A,B (1)
where Wi is the intertemporal sum of overall gross proﬁts for MNCs with a
home base in country i plus tax revenues from subsidiaries located in i of
MNCs with home base in country j 6= i. The maximization of (1) is part of
a sequential game, where at stage 1 each government sets its tax rate (τi);
at stage 2, the ﬁrms in country A and B decide whether to invest at time 0
or at time 1.
Solving (1), Panteghini and Schjelderup [39] prove the existence of a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium tax rate, which equates at the margin the social cost
of taxation to its social beneﬁt. They then focus on the eﬀects of market
openness in this tax competitive setting. It is worth noting that market
openness is negatively aﬀected by the minimum size of the sunk costs needed
to undertake FDI and is positively aﬀected by the average proﬁtability of
investing ﬁrms. A fall in sunk costs may be related to globalization, as long
as tighter economic integration causes a reduction in technical barriers such
as national standards and other factors that lower investment costs. A rise
in average proﬁtability may also be linked to globalization and more specif-
ically to the decrease in transportation costs as well as the formidable rise
in skill-biased technology and information systems such as the Internet.6 It
5Further evidence is discussed in Markusen [32].
6Notice that information technology allows ﬁrms to outsource tasks to low-cost suppli-
ers. Moreover, it has improved communications and thus decision making.
5is thus reasonable to expect that such factors have a positive eﬀect on proﬁt
income. Along this line of reasoning Panteghini and Schjelderup [39] prove
that:
Proposition 1 A decrease in size of the sunk cost needed to undertake FDI
and/or an increase in proﬁtability raises the equilibrium tax rate.
The reasoning behind proposition 1 is straightforward: a decrease in size
of the sunk cost and/or an increase in proﬁtability encourages FDI activities.
This allows the two competing countries to set a higher tax without deterring
FDI. Moreover, an improvement in business proﬁtability raises the number
of MNCs and thus widens the overall tax base. Hence, higher tax rates
combined with wider tax bases in both countries yield larger tax revenue.7
Panteghini and Schjelderup [39] also examine the eﬀect of income shifting
on the equilibrium tax rate. They ﬁnd that:
Proposition 2 A decrease in the cost of shifting proﬁt decreases the equilib-
rium tax rate.
According to proposition 2, a decrease in the cost of income shifting makes
income shifting less costly and thus stimulates tax competition: this induces
governments to set lower tax rates.8
Empirical evidence shows that FDI and multinational ﬁrms are a signif-
icant part of economic output and investment in many countries. For this
reason, the transmission of country-speciﬁc shocks by means of MNCs’ ac-
tivities is a phenomenon that deserves particular attention. Panteghini and
Schjelderup [39] show that:
7These results are in line with Devereux et al. [19], who ﬁnd a positive relationship
between the extent of tax competition and the openness of countries.
8This result has an interesting policy implication as it helps to explain the widespread
introduction of anti-avoidance rules: as long as governments can oﬀset avoidance by raising
its cost, they can set a higher tax rate. A similar point is made by Panteghini [37], who
analyzes the relationship between MNCs’ ﬁnancial policies and governments’ tax strategies.
6Proposition 3 Increased volatility lowers the equilibrium tax rates, and re-
duces tax revenue.
The reasoning behind proposition 3 is as follows. According to the BNP,
an increase in volatility discourages FDI. This induces ﬁrms with an inter-
mediate proﬁtability to delay their investment decision. Thus the number of
ﬁrms that immediately undertake FDI is less. Subsequently, however, only
af r a c t i o no ft h eﬁrms who delayed will receive good news and then invest.
The remaining part of ﬁrms will decide not to invest. This means that an
increase in volatility reduces the overall number of ﬁr m si n v o l v e di nF D I .
The governments’ policy response is therefore to lower the tax rate in order
to partially oﬀset the negative impact of increased volatility.
It is worth noting that a government’s reputation may be a crucial deter-
minant of ﬁscal policies. As shown by Panteghini [37]:
Proposition 4 An increase in the risk of expropriation by the government
leads to a decrease in the equilibrium tax rate.
The reasoning behind proposition 4 is as follows: an increase in the risk
of expropriation stimulates borrowing and allows MNCs to shift a greater
amount of income.9 In order to oﬀset the increase in income shifting op-
portunities,10 governments therefore tend to set lower tax rates. This means
that an increase in credibility, i.e., a lower probability of expropriation, allows
governments to set higher tax rates.11
These ﬁndings may help to explain the dynamics of capital income taxa-
tion. The fall in tax rates ﬁts with the interpretation that the globalization
process has led to increased volatility (proposition 3). However, the hypoth-
esis that proﬁts have become more volatile leads to a fall in tax revenue and
9On MNCs’ ﬁnancial strategies see e.g. Desai [15], [16], and Panteghini [37], [38].
10For a discussion on anti-avoidance rules see e.g. Garbarino and Panteghini [22]
11This point has some similarities with Cherian and Perotti [11], who showed that a
gradual increase in reputation allows governments to attract a greater amount of FDIs.
7thus fails to explain the empirical ﬁndings of stable tax revenue over time
(as does the entire tax competition literature). Such stability may be due to
the second possible explanation oﬀered in Panteghini and Schjelderup [39],
namely the fall in trade barriers. As pointed out in proposition 1, foreign
m a r k e t so p e nu pi nt h a tm o r eﬁrms undertake FDI. This may oﬀset the in-
crease in volatility and make the net eﬀect on tax revenue close to zero. A
third determinant of tax rate changes is the cost of tax sheltering activities,
which depend on anti-avoidance rules, consulting expenses, and transaction
costs (proposition 2). Whenever the reduction in transaction and (tax and
ﬁnancial) consultancy costs overcomes the negative eﬀect of more stringent
anti-avoidance rules, it is natural to expect a tax rate cut. Finally, an in-
crease in the government’s reputation may lead to a rise in the statutory
corporate tax rate (proposition 4).
3 Empirical implementation
The empirical predictions of the theoretical model outlined in section 2 are
tested on a large panel data set of countries in the time span 1983-2003.
We start by estimating a standard reduced-form equation to determine the
c o r p o r a t et a xr a t ea n dt u r ni nt h en e x ts e c t i o nt oe s t i m a t eas t r u c t u r a lm o d e l
where the tax rate and the tax base (the inﬂow of FDI) are determined
simultaneously.
3.1 Reduced form corporate tax rate equation
First, in order to explore the impact of capital market openness and various
volatility measures on the corporate tax rate setting process, let us estimate
a dynamic reduced form equation such as (2) below:




itγ + fi + ht + εit (2)
8where the corporate tax setting policy of country i in period t is represented
by τit. Since the relevant tax rate in explaining the proﬁts h i f t i n g - m o t i v a t e d
decisions of MNCs is the statutory rate, here we use a country’s top statutory
corporate income tax rate as the dependent variable.
By estimating the corporate tax setting equation (2), we aim at ﬁnding
whether, after controlling for a number of structural determinants of cor-
porate tax setting policy (xit), various measures of economic and political
volatility (vector vit) have an impact on the corporate tax rate. Indeed,
countries in which economic, social and political fundamentals are highly
volatile and uncertain should have an increase in the outﬂow of domestic
ﬁrms and a decrease in the inﬂow of FDI. Volatility should therefore act, by
means of tax base adjustments, on the level of the corporate tax rate.
Equation (2) includes among regressors a one-period lag of the corporate
tax rate (τit−1) in order to take into account the high degree of persistency
in the corporate tax rate that is typically observed. The model also includes
time eﬀects (ht) in order to capture the inﬂuence of time-speciﬁcc o m m o n
shocks, and country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (fi) to account for country charac-
teristics that are constant over time (such as geographic location).
Following recent empirical literature in this area (Slemrod [43], Winner
[45], Hauﬂer et al. [25]), the set of control variables xit in the corporate
tax setting equation (2) includes country size, an index of capital mobility,
government spending, the rate of employment, the demographic structure of
the population and the level of personal income tax. Country size is measured
by GDP.12 We can expect a positive eﬀect of GDP on the corporate tax rate.13
Secondly, the degree of capital mobility might be a relevant factor to ex-
plain FDI decisions by MNCs. Now, an often invoked reason for the apparent
decline of tax rates on proﬁts is that ﬁrms can choose the location of their
12It should be noticed that GDP might also be a proxy for the size of the corporate
income tax base. Consequently, when estimating equation (2) we allow for potential
endogeneity of the GDP variable with respect to corporate taxation policy.
13See Bucovetsky [8], Wilson [44] and Hauﬂer and Wooton [26].
9plants in order to reduce the amount of tax paid to governments. Govern-
ments that impose restrictions on capital ﬂow should face an inelastic tax
base and should consequently be able to set higher tax rates than open coun-
tries. Measuring the actual degree of capital openness of a country, though,
is a rather diﬃcult task (Winner [45]). Slemrod [43] employs the discrete
Sachs-Warner index of trade openness, that, however, is only an imperfect
proxy for the actual degree of capital mobility. Other indicators - such as the
stock of foreign FDI in a country - are not suitable measures either, because,
by changing sluggishly over time, they tend to capture other time-invariant
aspects of a country that make it an attractive destination for foreign in-
vestors (such as its size and human capital stock). In the empirical work, we
therefore use the Chinn and Ito [12] index of capital market openness that
is based on the legal restrictions imposed on the international mobility of
capital and ﬁrms.14
Equation (2) also includes a measure of government expenditure: since
tax revenues are used to ﬁnance public expenditure, the degree of public
consumption could be an important element to explain the corporate tax rate
of a country. There is some evidence, though, that the statutory tax rate is
not signiﬁcantly correlated with the ﬁscal needs of the government (Slemrod
[43]). Some authors (Hauﬂer et al. [25]) even found that the amount of public
expenditure inﬂuences negatively the corporate income tax rate.15 Therefore,
the sign of the coeﬃcient on public spending is a priori ambiguous. We use
the ratio of government expenditure to GDP as a measure of public sector
intervention.
14The Chinn and Ito [12] capital openness indicator is based on data taken from the
IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. While similar
to the Quinn [40] index of capital mobility, we use the Chinn and Ito index because it is
more up-to-date (it covers the period 1970-2004, while the Quinn index is available only
up to 1999 for some countries and 1997 for others) and for a larger subset of countries
(181 against the 90 of the Quinn Index). See also Chinn and Ito [13]
15They interpret this result with the argument that high-spending countries reveal a
stronger preference for public goods. To sustain the welfare state, therefore, policy-makers
have to reduce their tax rates in order not to induce an outﬂow of ﬁrms and tax base.
10In addition, equation (2) includes the employment rate (total employment
over total population) as a measure of the size of the labour tax base, and the
proportion of young (below age 14) and elderly (above age 65) population to
account for potential demographic pressures on tax revenue requirements.
Finally, equation (2) includes the (top) personal income tax rate: ac-
cording to the so-called “backstop hypothesis” (Slemrod [43]), one of the
key reasons for taxing corporate income is to prevent citizens from avoiding
personal taxation by incorporating their income. As a result, the statutory
corporate tax rate should be higher in countries where the top personal in-
come tax rate is high.
3.2 Measures of volatility
In addition, equation (2) includes a number of economic and political volatil-
ity indicators among regressors.
3.2.1 Economic volatility
As far as economic volatility is concerned, the usual strategy is to calculate
the standard deviation of the relevant variables along intervals of 5 or 10
years.16 In our framework, though, that strategy would be pretty costly in
terms of data loss. Consequently, in order to fully exploit the information
contained in our data set, we calculate the standard deviation of the relevant
variable through the ﬁve previous years. For example, in order to calculate
the volatility of the interest rate in year 2000, we calculate the standard
deviation of the interest rates from 1996 to 2000. As a result, this measure
amounts to a kind of “moving average” index of volatility. This measure is
calculated for three economic variables: GDP growth rate, real interest rate
and nominal exchange rate.
16Notice that this strategy is employed, in particular, in the growth literature that
studies the impact of volatility and uncertainty on GDP growth rates. See, e.g, Ramey
and Ramey [41] and Aghion et al. [1].
11Firstly, GDP is a measure of the aggregate income of a country and of the
size of the market. The literature on FDI (see e.g. Markusen [32]) reports
evidence that the horizontal-type multinational - i.e., multinationals that
sell their products to the host country’s customers - is the most widespread
form of multinational enterprise among OECD countries. It is therefore
reasonable to expect that, coeteris paribus, MNCs prefer to settle in stable
and expanding markets, especially when the investment choice is to some
extent irreversible. This ﬁnding is in line with Panteghini and Schjelderup
[39].
Secondly, interest rate volatility might be important in the light of the
role of the tax system in shaping the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms. This is
due to the fact that interest expenses are usually deductible from corporate
taxable income, and oﬀer MNCs a tax shield by making use of both the
internal (through the so called “debt shifting” between aﬃliates) and exter-
nal credit market.17 As a result, real interest rate variability could have a
number of eﬀects on MNCs’ strategies. First, it could require multinational
ﬁrms that invest in uncertain countries to continuously adjust the optimal
debt/asset ratio in response to the changing credit market conditions. Sec-
ond, MNCs that invest in uncertain environments could be forced to change
their internal/external debt strategy in response to external credit market
conditions of the foreign aﬃliates. Third, MNCs that use the internal credit
market channel can shift proﬁts and tax burden from one country to another
by using the debt shifting option. However, an arm’s length interest rate is
typically used by ﬁscal authorities in order to calculate the ﬁscal burden on
ﬁrms. Uncertainty in interest rates applicable to “between aﬃliates” debt
shifting transactions could then aﬀect the feasibility and proﬁtability of such
17In particular, external credit market conditions proved to be important determinants
of the ﬁnancial structure of multinationals’aﬃliates in developed credit markets countries
(see Desai et al. [18]) and for partly foreign-owned ﬁrms (see Mintz and Weichenrieder
[36]). Moreover, as shown in Desai et al. [18], multinational aﬃliates substitute external
and internal debt according to the evolution of credit market conditions.
12proﬁt shifting strategies.
Finally, in line with Chen and So [10], we use the exchange rate volatility
as a measure of the variability of the relative price of domestic and foreign
goods.
3.2.2 Political volatility
Vector vit in equation (2) also includes two measures of “political uncer-
tainty.”
First, we account for changes in a government’s policy by a variable re-
porting the number of changes of a country’s government over the previous
ﬁve years (see the Appendix for details). Since changes in government compo-
sition are often associated with relevant policy changes, this variable should
capture the degree of stability of policy orientation of a country’s government.
Second, we control for private property protection using an indicator
(ranging from 0 to 10) that measures the degree of private property pro-
tection and consequently the probability of expropriation.18
Descriptive statistics and data sources of all variables used in the analysis
are reported in the Appendix.
3.3 Results
Equation (2) is estimated on the unbalanced panel data set described in the
Appendix, using the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond [3].
After taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of equation (2) to eliminate the country ﬁxed
eﬀects, the Arellano-Bond estimator uses twice and more lagged values of τ
as instruments for the lagged dependent variable in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equa-
tion, under the hypothesis that ﬁrst-order serial correlation in the residuals
of the equation in levels is nil.
18Using an index of “social conﬂict” measuring the degree of social tension in a country
(including various symptoms of social unrest, such as strikes, anti-government demon-
strations, political assassinations and riots) and the probability of an abrupt change in
government’s policy and compostion gave very similar results.
13Moreover, using a GMM approach we also control for potential endogene-
ity of other right hand side variables (in particular, government spending,
GDP and personal income tax rate). The matrix of instruments includes all
o ft h ee x o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e sa sw e l la st h e i rl a g s .
The GMM estimation results of equation (2) are shown in tables 1 and
2. The Arellano and Bond [3] tests for the presence of auto-correlation in
the residuals reject the null hypothesis of no ﬁrst-order autocorrelation and
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation. This
suggests that twice-lagged values of τ are valid instruments for ∆τit−1.I n -
strument validity is also conﬁrmed by the Hansen test results reported at the
bottom of tables 1 and 2. Finally, the standard errors shown in the table are
robust to the presence of auto-correlation and heteroschedasticity.
Table 1, column (a), reports the estimation results of a standard speciﬁ-
cation including no volatility measure; column (b) shows the estimates when
the ﬁve-year standard deviation of real interest rate (measured by the prime
lending rate minus the inﬂation rate) is included in the equation as a measure
of “economic” volatility. Column (c) also adds the two “political” volatility
indicators: the index of property rights protection and the number of changes
in government over the previous ﬁve years.
Similarly to earlier studies, the auto-regressive coeﬃcient on the lagged
dependent variable shows a high degree of persistence of the statutory corpo-
rate tax rate, with an auto-regressive coeﬃcient of about 0.9. As far as the
control variables are concerned, all have the expected sign: larger countries
in terms of GDP size - as well as those with higher percentages of young and
old population - appear to set higher corporate tax rates, while government
spending and employment are estimated imprecisely. Moreover, neither the
level of the personal income tax rate nor the index of capital market openness
are statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, the results are similar to those obtained
in Slemrod [43], where ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation leaves a large fraction of the
time-series variance of the corporate tax rate unexplained.
14Table 1 Reduced-form corporate tax rate determination equation (I)
τit
(a) (b) (c)
τit−1 0.911 (0.034)*** 0.898 (0.047)*** 0.906 (0.043)***
openness -0.062 (0.074) -0.063 (0.117) -0.052 (0.095)
GDP 1.606 (0.661)** 0.940 (0.508)* 0.931 (0.467)**
public spending -0.013 (0.015) -0.016 (0.013) -0.007 (0.013)
personal income tax 0.004 (0.015) -0.003 (0.021) -0.012 (0.014)
employment -1.761 (1.878) -2.206 (2.855) -1.294 (2.170)
% old 0.119 (0.045)*** 0.099 (0.040)** 0.100 (0.033)***
% young 0.056 (0.021)*** 0.056 (0.030)* 0.051 (0.019)***
VOLATILITY
real interest rate -0.105 (0.043)** -0.112 (0.037)***
property rights -0.090 (0.081)
political -0.062 (0.128)
observations 1646 1153 1133
countries 114 89 87
time eﬀects yes yes yes





























1) dependent variable: top statutory corporate income tax rate;
2) robust standard errors in parentheses;
3) *, **, ***: signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, 1%;
4) the Arellano-Bond test for an AR(1)/AR(2) error process in the equation
in ﬁrst diﬀerences is distributed as a standard normal z(0,1);
5) the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (k) is distributed as κ2
k.
15Table 2 Reduced-form corporate tax rate determination equation (II)
τit
(d) (e) (f)
τit−1 0.916 (0.043)*** 0.910 (0.038)*** 0.904 (0.043)***
openness -0.065 (0.089) -0.079 (0.076) -0.062 (0.091)
GDP 1.402 (0.553)** 2.931 (1.213)** 3.423 (1.144)***
public spending -0.013 (0.012) -0.016 (0.016) -0.019 (0.010)*
personal income tax -0.003 (0.016) -0.001 (0.014) -0.005 (0.017)
employment -2.072 (2.184) -2.511 (2.644) -2.692 (2.712)
% old 0.154 (0.061)** 0.130 (0.047)*** 0.130 (0.041)***
% young 0.064 (0.027)** 0.055 (0.018)*** 0.058 (0.020)***
VOLATILITY
nominal exchange rate -0.967 (0.288)*** -1.067 (0.302)***
GDP growth rate -0.005 (0.040)
property rights -0.032 (0.081) 0.017 (0.065)
political -0.661 (0.685) -0.128 (0.137)
observations 1496 1611 1504
countries 99 113 99
time eﬀects yes yes yes





























1) dependent variable: top statutory corporate income tax rate;
2) robust standard errors in parentheses;
3) *, **, ***: signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, 1%;
4) the Arellano-Bond test for an AR(1)/AR(2) error process in the equation
in ﬁrst diﬀerences is distributed as a standard normal z(0,1);
5) the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (k) is distributed as κ2
k.
16As far as our volatility indicators are concerned, the standard deviation of
the real interest rate has a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on the corporate tax
rate. This result is in line with the theoretical predictions of section 2,i nt h e
sense that, since volatility reduces the overall number of ﬁr m si n v o l v e di nF D I
activities, a government’s optimal policy response consists in lowering the
corporate tax rate in order to partially oﬀset the negative impact of increased
volatility. On the other hand, the indexes of political volatility, while having
the expected negative sign, are not estimated at having a signiﬁcant impact
on corporate taxation policy.
Table 2, column (d), shows the results when using the standard deviation
of the GDP growth rate as a measure of economic volatility, while columns (e)
and (f) use the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate as a measure
of economic volatility. The results show that the nominal exchange rate
volatility has a negative and signiﬁcant impact, while the political uncertainty
variables and GDP growth rate volatility are not estimated at having any
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the corporate tax rate.
4 Structural model estimation
While an estimate of the corporate tax equation (2) supports the hypothesis
that economic volatility measured by the interest rate and exchange rate
variability plays a role in the corporate tax setting process, it is unable to
reveal how volatility works. In fact, the corporate tax determination equation
can be thought of as a reduced form of a two-equation structural model.
Similarly to the speciﬁcation used in Brett and Pinkse [7], the structural form
speciﬁcation comprises a tax base determination equation that models the tax
base (the FDI inﬂow in our case) as a function of a given set of exogenous
variables including our measures of volatility, as well as the corporate tax
rate. Secondly, the empirical model includes the tax rate setting equation,
where the corporate tax rate is regressed on a set of variables that includes
17the endogenously determined size of the tax base.
In particular, we can verify whether the volatility measures that proved
to be signiﬁcant determinants of corporate taxation policy exert their eﬀect
through the FDI ﬂow into a country, and whether a country’s policy-makers
react to changes in the tax bases by manoeuvring the tax rates. Indeed,
according to the theoretical model outlined in section 2,w es h o u l de x p e c t
volatility variables to inﬂuence negatively the FDI inﬂow, while the statutory
tax rate should be positively correlated with the net inﬂow of FDI.
As a result, the structural form we employ is made up of the following
two equations, where the corporate tax rate (τit) and the tax base (FDI ﬂow,
bit) are determined simultaneously:
τit = ρτit−1 + αbit + x
0





itφ + κτit−1 + gi + mt + ηit (4)
In equation (3), the top statutory corporate tax rate depends on its own
lag (τit−1) and on a vector of variables (xit) including demographic compo-
sition of the population, rate of urbanization, public spending as a share of
GDP, employment rate, personal income tax rate and the logarithm of the
size of FDI outﬂows.19 Moreover, equation (3) includes the logarithm of the
FDI inﬂow (bit) through parameter α.
The logarithm of the FDI inﬂow bit appears as the dependent variable in
equation (4), where it depends on a set of exogenous variables (zit), on our
volatility measures (vit) and on the lagged statutory tax rate (τit−1), based
on the assumption that FDI ﬂow adjusts to changes in the corporate taxation
policy with a one-year lag.20 The vector zit includes a number of variables
that should capture the attractiveness of a location for FDI: the duration of
19Apart from demographics and urbanization rate, all other variables are allowed to be
endogenous.
20Using the contemporaneous statutory tax rate made identiﬁcation of the parameters
more diﬃcult, while not leading to substantially diﬀerent results.
18education of people aged 25 and more as an index of human capital endow-
ment of a country, an index of infrastructure endowment represented by the
ratio of the length of the road and railway network over the area of a country,
and an index of productivity (GDP per worker).21 Finally, both equations
include GDP and the Chinn-Ito index of capital market openness.
The model is estimated by three stage least squares (3SLS) and both
equations include time (ht,m t) and country (fi,g i) ﬁxed eﬀects. The results
found by using the standard deviation of the real interest rate as a measure
of economic volatility are reported in table 3.22 In order to allow for the
fact that FDI inﬂow might aﬀect the volatility of the real interest rate, we
t r e a ti ta se n d o g e n o u sb yu s i n gi t so w nl a g sa sw e l la st h eﬁve-year standard
deviation of savings and nominal exchange rate as instruments. On the other
hand, the two political volatility variables are taken as exogenous.
The equation (4) reveals that the lagged statutory corporate tax rate has
a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀe c to nt h es i z eo fF D Iﬂowing into a
country. Moreover, the economic volatility variable is estimated in having a
negative and signiﬁcant impact on FDI: at mean values, the implied elasticity
of FDI compared to the interest rate volatility equals around −0.7. Coher-
ently with the reduced form estimates, political volatility indicators, while
having the expected negative sign, are not estimated to have a signiﬁcant
role in the tax base determination process.
As far as other variables are concerned, the measures of human capital,
infrastructure endowment and productivity do not appear to inﬂuence the
FDI inﬂow. While these results might be explained by the fact that those
variables are measured with an error and fail to properly capture a country’s
attractiveness for foreign investment, they are compatible with the hypothesis
that proﬁt shifting is the leading force driving FDI ﬂow. In neither case, the
backstop hypothesis is supported by our ﬁndings.
21See de Mooij and Ederveen [14] for a review of the empirical literature on the deter-
minants of FDI.
22Similar results emerge when using the nominal exchange rate volatility.
19Table 3 Structural-form model: FDI and corporate tax rate
τit bit
τit−1 0.742 (0.229)*** -0.099 (0.048)**
bit 2.292 (0.900)**
human capital -0.025 (0.386)
infrastructure -0.070 (1.204)
productivity -0.086 (0.100)
GDP 1.162 (2.722) 0.998 (5.978)
openness -1.602 (0.520)*** 0.240 (0.100)**
% old -0.205 (2.013)
% young -0.210 (1.330)
urbanization -0.162 (0.643)
public spending 0.210 (1.079)
employment 0.278 (1.884)
personal income tax 0.217 (0.174)
FDI outﬂow -1.979 (1.085)*
VOLATILITY
real interest rate -0.125 (0.037)***




Hansen-Sargan test (p value) 0.73
time eﬀects yes yes
ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
Notes
1) dependent variables: τit = top statutory corporate income tax rate; bit =
log(FDI inﬂow);
2) robust standard errors in parentheses;
3) the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is distributed as χ2
(30);
4) *, **, ***: signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, 1%.
20Estimation of the tax rate determination equation that explicitly includes
FDI on the right hand side shows that the latter variable has the expected
positive and signiﬁcant impact on the corporate tax rate. This conﬁrms
the model predictions. Unlike the reduced form speciﬁcation, the Chinn-Ito
measure of capital openness now has the expected negative impact on the
corporate tax rate, consistent with the view that opening up an economy
enhances the competitive downward pressure on tax rates. It is remarkable
that the openness variable is estimated in having a positive eﬀect on the
inﬂow of FDI: this suggests that the small importance of this variable when
estimating the reduced form tax setting equation might be due to the fact
that the two opposite eﬀects of the capital openness measure on FDI and tax
rates respectively tend to cancel each other out.
Overall, the evidence from the estimate of the structural model suggests
that the degree of volatility as well as the extent of capital market openness
aﬀect FDI ﬂow and corporate tax setting. In particular, our results suggest
that economic volatility tends to inhibit FDI inﬂow and, by reducing the
available tax base, it exerts a negative eﬀect on the level of the corporate tax
rate.
5 Concluding remarks
This article is based on a theoretical framework that allows for irreversibility
in the investment decision of MNCs and for the possibility of proﬁts h i f t i n g
via transfer pricing. Thus it has explored the role of capital market openness
and political and economic volatility on FDI ﬂow and corporate tax rate
determination. The empirical analysis, based on a large panel data set of
countries over the 1983-2003 period, gives the following main results. First,
when a reduced-form dynamic equation of corporate tax rate determination is
estimated by the generalised method of moments (GMM), the top statutory
corporate tax rate is estimated to be negatively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
21economic volatility. On the other hand, the indicators of political volatility
and capital market openness, while having the expected sign, do not have a
signiﬁcant impact on corporate taxation policy. Second, when estimating a
structural model that allows for simultaneous determination of the corporate
tax rate and the ﬂow of FDI into a country, it turns out that a country’s de-
gree of capital market openness is important to determine FDI inﬂow and set
corporate tax rates, and that economic volatility tends to aﬀect the corporate
tax rate through its negative impact on FDI inﬂow.
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27Appendix
1. Baseline full sample of countries (114 countries). Longest
time period: 1983-2003 (unbalanced panel).
Argentina#, Australia#, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain#, Bangl-
adesh#, Barbados, Belgium#, Belize, Bolivia#, Botswana#, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada#,C h i l e #,C h i n a ,C o l o m b i a #, Congo (Re-
public of), Costa Rica#, Cote d‘Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus#, Czech Republic,
Denmark#, Dominican Republic, Ecuador#,E g y p t #, El Salvador, Estonia,
Fiji, Finland#,F r a n c e #,G a b o n ,G e r m a n y #, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala#,
Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary#, Iceland, India#,I n d o n e s i a #,I r a n ,
Ireland#,I s r a e l #,I t a l y #,J a m a i c a #, Japan#, Kazakhstan, Kenya#,R e p u b -
lic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia#,M a l t a ,
Mauritius#,M e x i c o #, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands#,N e t h e r -
lands Antilles, New Zealand#, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway#,O m a n ,P a k -
istan, Panama#, Papua New Guinea#,P a r a g u a y #,P e r u #, Philippines#,
Poland#,P o r t u g a l #, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore#,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa#,S p a i n #,S r iL a n k a #,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden#,S w i t z e r l a n d #, Tanzania, Thailand#, Trinidad
& Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom#,
United States#, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela#,V i e t n a m ,Z a m b i a ,Z i m -
babwe.
2. Variable name (number of observations; mean; standard de-
viation; minimum value; maximum value), description and source.
• Capital market openness index (3250; 0.068; 1.548; -1.753; 2.623):
Chinn-Ito capital openness measure. This indicator assumes higher
values when countries become more open. Chinn and Ito [12]. Dataset
downloadable at: www.ssc.wisc.edu.
28• Corporate tax rate (2209; 34.32; 10.78; 0; 75): central government top
corporate income statutory tax rate. World Tax Database at the Michi-
gan Ross School of Business (www.bus.umich.edu), integrated with
data from World Bank (WDI) and from KPMG (Corporate tax rates
survey, issues from 1998 to 2003).
• Education (2131; 3.50; 1.71; 0.30; 7.67): average years of schooling
of people aged 25 or more. This variable should capture the human
capital endowment of a country. Data are provided on a ﬁve years
basis. Consequently, in years with missing data -since this variable
evolves slowly over time-, we have considered it as constant and equal
to the most recent data available. Quality of Governance Dataset
(www.qog.pol.gu.se). Original Source: Barro-Lee Education Attain-
ment dataset.
• E m p l o y m e n t( 3 1 7 6 ;0 . 4 4 4 ;0 . 0 6 6 ;0 . 2 41; 0.599): ratio of total employ-
ment over total population. This variable should measure the impor-
tance of the tax base composed of wages and salaries. Own calculations
b a s e do nP W Td a t a .
• FDI inﬂow (2689; 5.109; 3.162; -9.557; 16.403): log of the total in-
ﬂow of FDI in constant 2000 USA millions of dollars. UNCTAD, FDI
indicators, available at http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/. Converted into
constant 2000 USA dollar using local currency/USA dollar nominal
exchange rate taken from PWT and CPI from IMF, International Fi-
nancial Statistics.
• FDI outﬂow (1996; 3.802; 4.265; -15.57; 17.103): log of the total out-
ﬂow of FDI expressed inconstant 2000 USA dollars. UNCTAD, FDI
indicators, available at http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/. Converted into
constant 2000 USA dollar using local currency/USA dollar nominal
29exchange rate taken from PWT and CPI from IMF, International Fi-
nancial Statistics.
• Infrastructure index (2260; -2.32; 1.93; -6.62; 1.78): ratio of the log
of the length of the road and railway line network over the log of the
total country area. This variable should measure the infrastructure
endowment of the country. Data are provided on a ﬁve years basis.
Consequently, in years with missing data -since this variable evolves
slowly over time-, we have considered it as constant and equal to the
most recent data available (see Serven and Calderon [9]).
• Old (3591; 6.232; 4.274; 1.00; 19.33): share of population aged 65 or
more. WDI.
• Young (3591; 34.76; 10.27; 14.11; 50.40): share of population aged 14
or less. WDI.
• Personal income tax (1974; 38.28; 18.17; 0; 90): central government
top personal income tax rate. World Tax Database at the Michigan
Ross School of Business (www.bus.umich.edu) . Integrated with data
from the World Bank (WDI) and, for OECD countries, with data from
the OECD Tax Database.
• Public spending (3447; 23.663; 10.950; 2.12; 98.27): government ex-
penditure share of GDP. Penn World Tables (PWT).
• Size (3447; 16.807; 2.269; 10.806; 23.112): log of Purchasing Power
Parity Gross Domestic Product in thousands of currency units. Penn
World Tables (PWT).
• Urbanization (3771; 51.20; 23.70; 4.22; 100): share of urban population.
WDI.
30• Exchange rate volatility (3393; 25.37; 73.97; 0; 798.8): standard devia-
tion in the rate of growth of the nominal exchange rate with the USA
dollar. In the estimates that use this variable, the USA was dropped
from the sample. PWT.
• GDP volatility (3313; 5.419; 5.308; 0.258; 60.035): standard devia-
tion of the GDP growth rate in the preceding ﬁve years. GDP is in
Purchasing Power Parity. Penn World Tables (PWT).
• Interest rate volatility (2308; 5.84; 9.81; 0.17; 346.20): standard devi-
ation of the real interest rate (deﬁned as nominal lending rate minus
inﬂation rate computed as the rate of growth of the GDP deﬂator) in
the preceding ﬁve years. WDI.
• Political instability (3801; 0.469; 0.694; 0; 4): total number of changes,
recorded in the preceding ﬁve years, in the executive composition.
Own calculations based on data taken from the Polcon dataset (www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu).
• Property rights protection (2417; 5.518; 1.885; 1.022; 9.624): degree of
property rights protection. Fraser Institute (www.freetheworld.com).
Until 1999, this variable is provided on a ﬁve years basis. Consequently,
in years with missing data -since this variable evolves slowly over time-,
we have considered it as constant and equal to the most recent data
available.
Notes:
1. #FDI data available.
2. PWT refers to: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Pro-
duction, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, Septem-
ber 2006.
313. WDI: World Development Indicators (2006), World Bank.
4. The FDI inﬂow and outﬂow variables comprise capital provided (either
directly or through other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor
to a FDI enterprise or capital received by a foreign direct investor from
a FDI enterprise. FDI includes the three following components: equity
capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. Equity capital
is the foreign direct investor’s purchase of shares of an enterprise in a
country other than that of its residence. Reinvested earnings include
the direct investor’s share (in proportion to direct equity participation)
of earnings not distributed as dividends by aﬃliates or earnings not
remitted to the direct investor. Such retained proﬁts by aﬃliates are
reinvested. Intra-company loans or intra-company debt transactions
refer to short- or long-term borrowing and lending of funds between
direct investors (parent enterprises) and aﬃliated enterprises.
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